CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

PROPOSED SHOP TOP HOUSING

34 MELBOURNE STREET, EAST MAITLAND NSW 2323 (LOT 1 SEC 15A DP15148)



CLIENT: WAYNE CROESE DATE: 16 DECEMBER 2022 PREPARED BY:



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APPENDICES

Appendix 1:	Architectural Plans prepared by Advantage Pty Ltd, 2022
Appendix 2:	Statement of Environmental Effects prepared by Advantage Pty Ltd, 2022

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The authors of this report are suitably qualified in the preparation of Crime Risk Assessment's, having completed the NSW Police Safer by Design and Local Government NSW CPTED courses.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is to assess the crime risk relating to the proposed shop top housing development at 34 Melbourne Street, East Maitland NSW 2323 (Lot 1 Sec 15A DP15148) (the site). This Crime Risk Assessment supports the development application (DA) for shop top housing consisting of two (2) ground floor commercial tenancies and 3 first floor dwellings, as well as associated site works including car parking facilities (the proposal).

This assessment uses qualitative and quantitative measures of the physical and social environment to analyse and minimise crime opportunity. The assessment reviews the proposed development against Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles and provides recommendations for the design, construction and future management practices of the development for Council's consideration.

1.2. SITE DESCRIPTION

The site is rectangular in shape being 693.12m² in size. It has frontages to both Melbourne Street (northwest) and Grant Street (southeast) of 13.715m and depth of approximately 50m. The site is flat and level.

Existing development on the site is in the form of a single storey weatherboard dwelling house of older housing stock with Colourbond roof. A wooden picket fence runs along the Melbourne Street frontage while a shed and carport is located at the rear along the Grant Street frontage. Several trees and small shrubs are present, including one street tree on Melbourne Street, but otherwise the site supports managed lawn.

Vehicle access to the site is via a crossover on Grant Street, while a pedestrian footpath facilitates access along Melbourne Street. There is on street parking on both street frontages.

Figure 1 below provides an aerial appreciation of the site.



Figure 1: Aerial view (Source: Aerometrex, 2022).



1.3. SURROUNDING AREA

The site is located within a mixed-use area characterised by commercial premises along Melbourne Street. To the south and east is residential areas with pockets of open space and recreation throughout including East Maitland Cricket Ground immediately to the south. Maitland East Public School is located further south while East Maitland Train station, Maitland Grossman High School and Maitland Gaol are found to the east. The New England Highway runs to the west of the site. There are also a number of licensed premises nearby the site, including the Bank Hotel some 80m west, the Hunter River Hotel some 180m northeast and the East Maitland Bowling Club some 150m southwest. Land to the north and west are characterised as rural properties. Location plans are provided at *Figure 2* and *Figure 3* below.



Figure 2: Location Plan – Cadastre NSW Map. Subject site outlined in red (Source: SIX Maps LPI Viewer).



Figure 3: Location Plan – NSW Imagery. Subject site outlined in red. (Source: SIX Maps LPI Viewer).



2. THE PROPOSAL

2.1. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT

The proposed development is for shop top housing consisting of 2 ground floor tenancy spaces expected for office use and 3 first floor dwellings, being two x 3 bedroom and one x 1 bedroom in nature. Associated site works including car parking facilities providing 7 car spaces are proposed as well.

2.1.1. Ground Floor Plans

The ground floor plans include the following elements:

- 2 commercial tenancies opposite Melbourne Street, with front porches and primary access off Melbourne Street. Secondary access is provided on the south side of the tenancies to the car park.
- A resident only entrance and foyer are provided opposite Melbourne Street also. Resident only access is also provided from the rear car park via stairs up to all three residences.
- Mailboxes for 2 residences and the 2 commercial tenancies are provided opposite Melbourne Street. Residence 3 has a mailbox located on Grant Street.
- Rear carpark providing for 7 car spaces, including communal bin storage areas, water tanks and limited landscaping. This car park is secured with fencing and a gate and is for residents and commercial staff only no visitor parking or access is provided.

2.1.2. First Floor Plans

The first-floor plans include the following elements:

Residential 1 and 2 (having identical layouts)

- Three bedrooms including master bedroom with walk in wardrobe and ensuite.
- Combined kitchen, living and dining area with access to a veranda opposite Melbourne Street.
- Rear deck accessed via the internal hallway including clothes line.
- Study nook.
- Bathroom, laundry and linen closet.

Residential 3

- 1 bedroom with built in robe and study nook.
- Combined kitchen, living and dining area with access out to a deck on the north side, which also provides the access to the residence. The clothes line is also provided here.
- Bathroom and laundry.

2.2. VEHICLE ACCESS AND PARKING

Vehicle access will be via a new driveway crossover from Grant Street with internal parking space for 7 cars including 1 accessible space and blind aisle to assist with turning. Spaces 4 - 7 will be located partially under residence 3.

The parking has been designed so that vehicles may enter and exit in a forward motion, with swept paths showing this.

There is a 1.8m high motorised sliding gate controlling access into the car park (type not specified), and 1.8m high timber paling boundary fencing is also proposed.

2.3. LANDSCAPING

There is landscaping provided within the rear car park, being 1.8m high boundary hedge planting along the west side boundary and lower ground covers along the south side boundary, adjacent the driveway. The plantings are low maintenance varieties and will only require standard upkeep / hedging.



2.4. WASTE MANAGEMENT

A communal area for domestic waste bins (2 per residence) is shown on the west side boundary. From plans, it is not clear if this is an enclosed or screened area but it does not appear so. There are commercial bins (2) located on the south side of the commercial tenancies. Again, it is unclear if these are screened or enclosed but it does not appear so.

It is expected that the bins will be collected by Council's general and recycling waste collection service. We further assume that bins will be placed on the Grant Street frontage for collection, rather than Melbourne Street.

Green waste will not be generated given the very limited landscaping and it is expected that this will be taken away by a contractor or the like during routine maintenance of the landscaping.

2.5. HOURS OF DELIVERIES / SERVICING

We have assumed that there would be no significant delivery or service vehicle movements considering the scale of the development. However, we would recommend that these be limited to the standard business hours of 9am to 5pm Monday to Friday.

2.6. COMMERCIAL USES AND STAFF CAPACITY

Final uses for the proposed ground floor commercial tenancies have not been specified at this time, but information from the Applicant suggests that the final uses will be "office" spaces, with standard office operating hours of 9am to 5pm Monday to Fridays, and no operation on weekends or public holidays.

Further, we are advised that the expected staff capacity would be 2 to 4 staff per commercial tenancy, providing a maximum of 8 staff on site.



3. CRIME RISK ASSESSMENT

3.1. METHODOLOGY

The methodology applied for the conduct of this crime risk assessment draws on the following documents:

- 'Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Applications: Guidelines under Section 4.15 of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979*'.
- Companion to Safer by Design Crime Risk Assessment, *NSW Police Safer by Design*.
- Maitland Development Control Plan 2011 Part C, Section C.8.19 Security, Site Facilities and Services.
- Maitland Community Safety Plan (2013-2016).

The Safer By Design program provided by the NSW Police Force summarises the accepted methodology, which this assessment implements and involves:

- A desktop assessment of the site and surrounding area.
- Review and summarise the proposed development plans and key operational details.
- Reviewing crime statistics for the local area.
- Liaising with the project team, including designers and specialist consultants where relevant.
- Review the Architectural Designs and other supporting plans against CPTED principles in accordance with Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Applications Guidelines
- Identify practical crime mitigation measures and/or design recommendations that can be employed in the project.
- Prepare a CPTED Report that summarises these findings and recommendations.

The assessment is based on the information as contained in the Architectural Plans (**Appendix 1**) as referred to in Section 2 of this report. In this regard, the report has been prepared based on the proposed development.

Having regard to the setting, scale and context of the development, the assessment and recommendations in this report are measures that may further mitigate the risk of crime within the proposed development. These measures alone, cannot eliminate the risk of crime and no guarantee is given or implied that the implementation of any measures identified in this report will render the development free from criminal activity.

Further, the assessment and recommendations in this report do not factor matters such as broader social, environmental, or economic impacts. The assessment and recommendations are made only in relation to mitigating the risk of crime, antisocial behaviour, and fear of crime for the proposed development.

3.2. RISK CONTEXT

3.2.1. Overview

The risk context for the proposal has been developed from a review of existing crime statistical data (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR), Recorded Crime Statistics 2021-2022) and assessment of the above-mentioned plans. In considering statistical information, it should be noted that only reported offences are captured and often a significant level of certain offences will be unreported and not reflected in the findings. The types of criminal offences most likely to be committed (or attempted) in or around a typical urban environment include:

- Theft of / from a motor vehicle;
- Assault and / or robbery (with or without a weapon);
- Stealing;
- Malicious damage; and,
- Drug offences.



3.3. CRIME TRENDS AND STATISTICS

3.3.1. Crime Trends

The NSW BOCSAR monitors and reports crime trends and statistics in NSW. BOCSAR provides analysis and evaluation on a number of crime categories and geographic locales. The most recent report of NSW Recorded Crime Statistics, July 2021 – June 2022, provides crime trend data for NSW and the Maitland Local Government Area (LGA). These are described in *Table 3-1* below.

 Table 3-1: Recorded incidents of selected offences in NSW and the Maitland LGA (annual totals and 24-month trend from July 2021 to June 2022)

Offence		Year to June 2021	Year to June 2022	Trend	Percentage Change
Mundon	NSW	58	64	Stable	**
Murder	Maitland LGA	1	0	Not Calculated *	*
Assault -	NSW	32,925	31,775	Stable	**
domestic violence related	Maitland LGA	429	541	Up	26.1%
Assault - non-	NSW	30,985	27,666	Stable	**
domestic violence related	Maitland LGA	368	341	Stable	**
	NSW	7,937	6,967	Stable	**
Sexual assault	Maitland LGA	132	127	Stable	**
Sexual touching, sexual	NSW	8,225	6,962	Stable	**
act and other sexual offences	Maitland LGA	122	97	Stable	**
Robbery without	NSW	1,149	793	Down	31%
a weapon	Maitland LGA	8	11	Stable	*
Robbery with a	NSW	110	79	Stable	**
firearm	Maitland LGA	0	2	Not Calculated	*
Robbery with a weapon not a firearm	NSW	865	658	Down	23.9%
	Maitland LGA	15	5	Stable	**
Break and enter	NSW	19,258	17,296	Stable	**
- dwelling	Maitland LGA	252	223	Stable	**
Break and enter	NSW	7,099	6,995	Stable	**
- non-dwelling	Maitland LGA	124	95	Down	23.4%
Motor vehicle	NSW	11,546	10,688	Stable	**
theft	Maitland LGA	167	161	Stable	**
Steal from	NSW	28,734	26,332	Stable	**
motor vehicle	Maitland LGA	344	508	Up	47.7%
Steal from retail	NSW	20,531	17,184	Stable	**
store	Maitland LGA	302	293	Stable	**
Steal from	NSW	16,453	15,516	Stable	**
dwelling	Maitland LGA	246	281	Stable	**
Steal from	NSW	2,095	1,652	Stable	**
person	Maitland LGA	17	20	Not calculated	*
Fraud	NSW	45,986	43,925	Stable	**
	Maitland LGA	457	595	Up	30.2%
Malicious	NSW	53,433	47,456	Down	11.2%
damage to property	Maitland LGA	783	722	Stable	**

* A trend is not calculated if at least one 12-month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents.

** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated. (Source: BOCSAR Crime Trends Tool, accessed 29 November 2022, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, reference NSW_trends21Q2 and LGA_trends21Q2).

As indicated in Table 3-1 above, the most common offences within the Maitland LGA between June 2021 and June 2022 are (listed from most common):

- 1. Malicious damage to property
- 2. Fraud
- 3. Assault domestic violence related
- 4. Theft steal from motor vehicle
- 5. Assault non-domestic violence related

Table 3-1 above also highlights that statically, crime rates for some of the most common offences are rising in the Maitland LGA whilst the rest remaining mostly stable. Specifically, rates for "assault – domestic violence", "theft – steal from motor vehicle" and "fraud" are trending up, with a percentage change greater than 26% for all three crimes. We do note that "theft – break and enter non-dwelling" is trending down, with a percentage change of 23.4%. Lastly, "assault – non-domestic violence" is stable, with a small decline (trend not substantial enough to be calculated).

The rates for crime (per 100,000 head of the population) are generally higher for the Maitland LGA when compared to the NSW average.

3.3.2. Crime Statistics

The following series of tables demonstrate the crime statistics during a 1 or 2-year trend period of either year to June 2021 or year to June 2022 (whichever has had the most recent data) for the suburb of East Maitland and the Maitland LGA (for comparison), including:

- Table 3-2: Overview of crime statistics
- Table 3-3: Incidents of theft
- Table 3-4: Incidents of non-domestic related malicious damage to property
- Table 3-5: Types of assault incidents

Table 3-2: Overview of crime statistics in East Maitland and Maitland LGA

			Year to J	une 2021	Year to June 2022		
Crime	Location	Trend (2 year)	Count	Rate	Count	Rate	
Assault	Maitland LGA	Up 11.4% per year	827	946.3	921	1053.8	
	East Maitland	Stable	136	1090	132	1057.9	
Homioido	Maitland LGA	n.c	1	1.1	0	0.0	
Homicide	East Maitland	n.c	0	0.0	0	0.0	
Debberg	Maitland LGA	n.c.	23	26.3	18	20.6	
Robbery	East Maitland	n.c	6	48.1	3	24	
Sexual	Maitland LGA	Stable	254	290.6	224	256.3	
assault	East Maitland	n.c	19	152.3	13	104.2	
Theft	Maitland LGA	Stable	2300	2631.7	2490	2849.1	
men	East Maitland	Stable	642	5145.5	515	4127.6	
Malicious	Maitland LGA	Stable	783	895.9	722	826.1	
damage to property - residential	East Maitland	Stable	154	1234.3	167	1338.5	
Traanaaa	Maitland LGA	Stable	99	113.3	117	133.9	
Trespass	East Maitland	Stable	27	216.4	38	304.6	
Offensive	Maitland LGA	Stable	30	34.3	33	37.8	
conduct	East Maitland	n.c	8	64.1	10	80.1	

Offensive	Maitland LGA	n.c.	12	13.7	14	16.0
language	East Maitland	n.c	4	32.1	6	48.1

(Source: BOCSAR Crime Mapping Tool, accessed 30 November 2022).

¹ rate is per 100,000 head of population.

² n.c means "not calculated". This generally occurs if the 12-monthly totals in the series have a value of <20.

³ stable means there is no significant upward or downward trend.

Having regard to the BOCSAR crime statistics in Table 3-2 above, the rate of crime in East Maitland is considered higher compared to the broader Maitland LGA, particularly with regards to the most prevalent types of crime. The following are the most likely offences in East Maitland for which specific mitigation measures should be designed and implemented for the proposal:

- 1. Theft;
- 2. Malicious damage to property residential.
- 3. Assault.

Each of these three crimes are reviewed in more detail in Tables 3-3 to 3-6 on the following pages.

Table 3-3 (below) further assesses the incidents of theft in East Maitland with respect to different types of theft. "Steal from retail store", "fraud" and "steal from motor vehicle" represent the largest forms of theft in East Maitland. Depending on the end uses of the commercial tenancies on the ground floor, the proposed shop top housing therefore has the potential to be impacted by the most common types of theft in East Maitland unless appropriate measures are implemented. Target hardening techniques, such as access control measures, should be employed here.

			Year to Ju	une 2021	21 Year to June 2022	
Crime		2-Year Trend	Count	Rate	Count	Rate
Theft	Maitland LGA	Stable	2300	2631.7	2490	2849.1
men	East Maitland	Stable	642	5145.5	515	4127.6
-Break & enter	Maitland LGA	Stable	252	288.3	223	255.2
dwelling	East Maitland	Stable	49	392.7	32	256.5
-Break & enter non-dwelling	Maitland LGA	Down 23.4% per year	124	141.9	95	108.7
	East Maitland	Stable	33	264.5	20	160.3
-Receiving	Maitland LGA	Stable	70	80.1	46	52.6
/handling stolen goods	East Maitland	n.c	15	120.2	9	72.1
-Motor vehicle	Maitland LGA	Stable	167	191.1	161	184.2
theft	East Maitland	Stable	30	240.4	26	208.4
-Steal from	Maitland LGA	Up 47.7% per year	344	393.6	508	581.3
motor vehicle	East Maitland	Stable	78	625.2	56	448.8
-Steal from retail	Maitland LGA	Stable	302	345.6	293	335.3
store	Wast Maitland	Stable	185	1482.7	171	1370.5
-Steal from	Maitland LGA	Stable	246	281.5	281	321.5
dwelling	East Maitland	Stable	41	328.6	38	304.6
-Steal from	Maitland LGA	n.c.	17	19.5	20	22.9
person	East Maitland	n.c	4	32.1	5	40.1
-Stock theft	Maitland LGA	n.c	4	4.6	0	0.0
-SLUCK LITEIL	East Maitland	n.c	0	0.0	0	0.0
-Fraud	Maitland LGA	Up 30.2% per year	457	522.9	595	680.8

Table 3-3: Incidents of theft in East Maitland and Maitland LGA



	East Maitland	Stable	108	865.6	105	841.5
-Other theft	Maitland LGA	Stable	317	362.7	268	306.7
	East Maitland	Stable	99	793.5	53	424.8

(Source: BOCSAR Crime Mapping Tool, accessed 30 November 2022).

¹ rate is per 100,000 head of population.

² n.c means "not calculated". This generally occurs if the 12-monthly totals in the series have a value of <20.

³ stable means there is no significant upward or downward trend.

Table 3-4 (below) further assesses the incidents of malicious damage to property in East Maitland. Malicious damage is considered the intentional destruction or defacement of public or private property and can include vandalism and graffiti. As demonstrated in Table 3-4, East Maitland recorded higher incident rates than Maitland LGA with the highest incidents occurring on residential premises, carparks and retail/wholesale premises. As such, the proposed development should focus on CPTED principles of access control and surveillance for the residences, car parks and the office spaces to prevent malicious damage.

			Year to	June 2021	Year to J	une 2022
		2-Year Trend	Count	Rate	Count	Rate
Total (no specifie	ed premises)					
	Maitland LGA	Stable	783	895.9	722	826.1
	East Maitland	Stable	154	1234.3	167	1338.5
Other premises:						
Retail/	Maitland LGA	Stable	76	87.0	75	85.8
wholesale	East Maitland	Stable	34	272.5	48	384.7
Financial	Maitland LGA	n.c	2	2.3	1	1.1
nstitution	East Maitland	n.c	0	0.0	0	0.0
Degraction	Maitland LGA	n.c.	8	9.2	6	6.9
Recreation	East Maitland	n.c	1	8.0	0	0.0
Desidential	Maitland LGA	Stable	474	542.4	454	519.5
Residential	East Maitland	Stable	65	521.0	56	448.8
Road/ Street/	Maitland LGA	Stable	86	98.4	59	67.5
Footpath	East Maitland	n.c	16	128.2	13	104.2
Park/Bushland/	Maitland LGA	Stable	6	6.9	3	3.4
Garden	East Maitland	n.c	0	0.0	2	16.0
Other outdoor/	Maitland LGA	n.c.	3	3.4	2	2.3
oublic places	East Maitland	n.c	1	8.0	1	8.0
Corpork	Maitland LGA	Stable	34	38.9	34	38.9
Carpark	East Maitland	n.c	14	112.2	18	144.3
_aw	Maitland LGA	n.c.	0	0.0	3	3.4
Enforcement	East Maitland	n.c	0	0.0	0	0.0
Public Transport	Maitland LGA	n.c	5	5.7	5	5.7
 Bus premises 	East Maitland	n.c	1	8.0	1	8.0
Public Transport	Maitland LGA	Stable	27	30.9	22	25.2
– Railway premises	East Maitland	n.c	10	80.1	9	72.1
Other Public	Maitland LGA	n.c	1	1.1	0	0.0
Transport Premises	East Maitland	n.c	1	8.0	0	0.0
School	Maitland LGA	n.c.	19	21.7	15	17.2
501001	East Maitland	n.c	3	24.0	6	48.1

Table 3-4: Incidents of malicious damage to property in East Maitland and Maitland LGA



			Year to	Year to June 2021		une 2022
		2-Year Trend	Count	Rate	Count	Rate
Other Education	Maitland LGA	n.c	6	6.9	5	5.7
Premises	East Maitland	n.c	0	0.0	0	0.0
Heenitel	Maitland LGA	n.c	3	3.4	1	1.1
Hospital	East Maitland	n.c	0	0.0	0	0.0
Other health	Maitland LGA	n.c	3	3.4	1	1.1
Other nearth	East Maitland	n.c	2	16.0	1	8.0
Licensed	Maitland LGA	n.c.	7	8.0	11	12.6
Premises	East Maitland	n.c	1	8.0	5	40.1
Other	Maitland LGA	Stable	23	26.3	25	28.6
Other	East Maitland	n.c	5	40.1	7	56.1

(Source: BOCSAR Crime Mapping Tool, accessed 30 November, 2022).

¹ rate is per 100,000 head of population.

² n.c means "not calculated". This generally occurs if the 12-monthly totals in the series have a value of <20.

³ stable means there is no significant upward or downward trend.

As demonstrated in Table 3-5 (below), the highest recorded incidents of assault in East Maitland were non-domestic related. These statistics (per 100,000 head of population) are also higher for East Maitland specifically than those for the greater Maitland LGA and more broadly NSW.

As the development is proposed within proximity to several licensed venues, incidents of alcohol related assault are also an important indicator to be assessed. As such, Table 3-5 (below) highlights that rates of alcohol related domestic and non-domestic assaults are lower than non-alcohol related assaults. These statistics can suggest the effectiveness of existing practices at licenced premises in East Maitland with respect to the responsible service of alcohol. This suggests that the proposed development's proximity to licensed premises will not subject visitors / residents to higher rates of assault.

			Year to Jun	e 2021	Year to June 2022	
Crime		2-Year Trend	Count	Rate	Count	Rate
Assault	Maitland LGA	Up 11.4% per year	827	946.3	921	1053.8
	East Maitland	Stable	136	1090.0	132	1057.9
-Domestic	Maitland LGA	Up 26.1% per year	429	490.9	541	619.0
assault	East Maitland	Stable	56	448.8	58	464.9
-Non-domestic assault	Maitland LGA	Stable	368	421.1	341	390.2
assaun	East Maitland	Stable	75	601.1	67	537.0
Account Dalica	Maitland LGA	Stable	30	34.3	39	44.6
-Assault Police	East Maitland	n.c	5	40.1	7	56.1
Domestic assault		·				
Alcohol related	Maitland LGA	Up 39.0% per year	105	120.1	146	167.1
	East Maitland	n.c	10	80.1	18	144.3
Non-alcohol related	Maitland LGA	Up 22.0% per year	324	370.7	397	454.3
related	East Maitland	Stable	46	368.7	40	320.6

Table 3-5: Types of assault incidents in East Maitland and Maitland LGA



Non-Domestic assault						
Alcohol related	Maitland LGA	Stable	82	93.8	75	85.8
	East Maitland	n.c	13	104.2	13	104.2
Non-alcohol related	Maitland LGA	Stable	286	327.2	267	305.5
	East Maitland	Stable	62	496.9	54	432.8

(Source: BOCSAR Crime Mapping Tool, accessed 30 November 2022).

¹ rate is per 100,000 head of population.

² n.c means "not calculated". This generally occurs if the 12-monthly totals in the series have a value of <20.

³ stable means there is no significant upward or downward trend.

3.3.3. Risk Rating

The risk rating is determined by identifying the likelihood of an incident taking place and measuring the consequence should the incident take place. The likelihood and risk are then checked against the Risk Rating Matrix based on the International Risk Management Standard AS/NZ/ISO:31000. Description of 'likelihood' and 'risk' are outlined in Tables 3-8 to 3-11 below.

Table 3-8: Measurement of Likelihood

L1	Rarely likely	Rarely likely to happen	
L2	Unlikely	Unlikely to happen at some stage	
L3	Possible	Possibly will happen at some stage	
L4	Likely	Likely to happen at some stage	
L5	Almost certain	Almost certain to happen at some stage	

Table 3-9: Measurement of Consequence

Table 3	-9: Measurement of Con	sequence
C1	Insignificant	Very minor harm or injury to people, financial loss (\$<2000) or damage to property, reputation or operation
C2	Minor	Minor harm or injury to people requiring on site medical treatment, financial loss (>\$2000) or damage to property, reputation or operation
C3	Moderate	Some harm or injury to people requiring medical treatment, financial loss or damage to property, reputation or operation
C4	Major	Serious harm or injury to people requiring hospitalisation, financial loss or damage to property, reputation or operation
C5	Catastrophic	Death, serious harm or injury to people, significant financial loss or damage to property, reputation or loss of operation

Table 3-10 below identifies the likelihood and consequence of the identified offences in order to identify the corresponding level of risk.

Table 3-10: Risk Rating Matrix

			Consequence		
Likelihood	Insignificant (C1)	Minor (C2)	Moderate (C3)	Major (C4)	Catastrophic (C5)
Rare (L1)	Low	Low	Moderate	High	High
Unlikely (L2)	Low	Low	Moderate	High	Extreme
Possible (L3)	Low	Moderate	High	Extreme	Extreme
Likely (L4)	Moderate	High	High	Extreme	Extreme
Almost Certain (L5)	High	High	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme

The level of risk is summarised in Table 3-11 below.

Table 3-11: Risk Rating

Crime/issue	Likelihood	Consequence	Rating
Theft	L3 (Possible)	C2 (Minor)	Moderate
Malicious damage	L3 (Possible)	C2 (Minor)	Moderate
Assault	L2 (Unlikely)	C3 (Moderate)	Moderate



Theft has been given a **moderate** rating. Rates of retail theft are higher compared with other forms of theft in East Maitland, though notably the expected commercial spaces won't be retail as such where higher volumes of visitors are expected and greater opportunities for theft are possible, instead being office space or the like. Further, "break and enter – dwelling and non-dwelling" were lower than retail theft and as such (with dwelling break and enters trending down), we would expect that lower rates of theft to occur for a development which includes shop top housing. Further, this provision of the residential component of this development will help monitor and provide surveillance for the tenancies below, particularly at night, and vice versa when people are less likely to be home during the day when the offices will be open.

Malicious damage has been given a **moderate** rating despite the higher rates when compared with the Maitland LGA and NSW generally. However, the statistics do not distinguish between specific types of residential development, be that a single dwelling or a medium density development. Further, the commercial tenancy component of the development provides a buffer between the public and residential spaces. Also, the consequences relate more to financial loss rather than risk to life, so a minor consequence has been applied in this instance.

Assault has been given a moderate rating as even though non-domestic rates of assault are higher than domestic related assault, the proposal does include non-domestic elements such as the office / commercial space. However, it is relevant to note that the proposed office uses are not ones in which there are inherently higher rates of crime, and there are no "office" subsets for the category of assault to investigate either. Furthermore, the rating of moderate is also influenced by the higher consequence rating given to such a crime and the serious type of harm and injury that this crime can inflict. Accordingly, a level of professional judgement should be used when using the risk matrix. So, when considering that the proposal includes residential elements with low impact office type uses (which have a lower rate of assault occurring), a low-moderate risk rating should be applied.

Summary. Accordingly, the level of risk for the proposal is considered to be between **low to moderate**. As stated, specific mitigation measures should be designed and implemented for the proposal to reduce the risk rating where practicable. This can be promoted through the incorporation of CPTED principles as discussed in Section 3.4 of this report.

3.3.4. Site Opportunity

The site has a main frontage to Melbourne Street to the north where there are pedestrian footpaths directly opposite the frontage. Vehicle access to the site is via a driveway accessible from Grant Street to the south. Parking is provided in the open car space at the rear of the site. Some spaces are partially covered by residence 3. The rear car park is secured with a 1.8m motorized gate and fencing, and access is to this area is restricted to those living and working within the site.

The site is located in a mixed use locality with low-density residential development located further east and interspersed through the immediate street, while commercial developments are located to the northeast and southwest with rural land beyond this. There are also numerous public recreational areas near the site including East Maitland Cricket Ground and East Maitland Bowling Club. The surrounding area could be characterised as being open and active, with an active street frontage along Melbourne Street attributed to surrounding businesses. Grant Street is also active and has a high level of natural and passive surveillance noted, from the Bowling Club and cricket grounds, and surrounding businesses (including the adjoining café) which also open up to and are accessed via Grant Street. The density of development around the site and the higher level of activity in and around Melbourne Street and Grant Street increases the opportunity for passive surveillance and higher activity deters criminal acts. As such, the likelihood of potential crime is lower when considering this site context.

The development should focus on providing appropriate surveillance, space management, access control and territorial reinforcement to minimise the opportunity for offences to occur within the site and to neighbouring buildings. These issues and recommended measures to mitigate risk are discussed further in the subsections below.



3.4. CPTED PRINCIPLES

The 'Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Applications: Guidelines under Section 79C (s4.15) of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act* 1979' state that:

"Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) seeks to influence the design of buildings and places by:

- increasing the perception of risk to criminals by increasing the possibility of detection, challenge and capture
- increasing the effort required to commit crime by increasing the time, energy or resources which need to be expended
- reducing the potential rewards of crime by minimising, removing or concealing 'crime benefits'
- o removing conditions that create confusion about required norms of behaviour."

Importantly, design alone cannot eliminate the risk of crime and the application of the principles and strategies of Safer By Design, including the particular outcomes identified in this report, will mitigate the risk of the offences occurring. In considering mitigation strategies and remedial actions there are four basic CPTED principles:

- Surveillance;
- Access control;
- Territorial reinforcement; and
- Environmental management and maintenance.

This report provides an assessment of the proposed development against each of these principles.

3.4.1. Surveillance

Good surveillance reduces the attractiveness of potential targets by increasing the risk of detection. This can be achieved through a combination of technical and natural surveillance including sightlines, lighting, closed-circuit television (CCTV) monitoring, and guardians of space.

Surveillance objectives and strategies include:

- Ensure that there is good surveillance both to and from and throughout the development to reduce opportunities for crime.
- Ensure clear sightlines between public and private places.
- Ensure that lighting in and around the development complies with relevant Australian Standards to increase surveillance opportunities during the hours of darkness.
- Ensure that lighting in and around the development is commensurate with the CCTV requirements (if applicable).
- Ensure that landscaping makes places attractive, but does not provide offenders with a place to hide or entrap victims.

Assessment of proposal and recommendations - Surveillance

A review of the proposed Architectural Plans (**Appendix 1**) and supporting information identified the following:

<u>Sightlines</u>

The building frontage (to Melbourne Street) is setback generally level with other buildings in the street, which are generally built on or close to the front boundary. The building has a ground level porch which opens up to Melbourne Street, with office spaces directly adjoining this. The building uses high levels of glazing on the ground floor to maximise natural surveillance and provide a natural connection between the occupants and those external, and in so-doing increasing the risk to potential offenders. There are no substantial obstructions to these windows or doors noted, with the approach to entrances clear and legible. The building entrances (two commercial spaces and residential foyer) are, while inset slightly from the street, are not inset in a way that would create hidden entrances and the building alignments are generally very even within the established "row", as described above. There are no obstructions on

Melbourne Street itself, albeit for one street tree which appears well maintained and does not allow for concealment. The open and flat nature of the area further ensures these sightlines are maintained.

On the first floor, the residences are afforded with verandas which are accessed directly via internal living spaces and are orientated to overlook the street. This ensures that residents can easily overlook the public domain increasing passive / natural surveillance of the street and subsequently increasing the risk to potential offenders.

Sightlines exist to the rear of the site, toward Grant Street and to other adjoining public and semi-public spaces. Rear decks are provided to the first-floor level of residence 1 and 2, and a window is provided from residence 3 which are all orientated to overlook Grant Street. There are some minor obstructions which may restrict views toward the street level directly adjoining the site, including existing metal sheds on the adjoining eastern site. Residence 3 would also obstruct some views from the rear deck of residence 2, when directed to the south/southeast. It is expected that this is a minor obstruction in the context and that generally, good sightlines toward Grant Street, the adjoining car park and the open spaces are available. The street and immediate space outside the site don't contain any obstructions.

On the ground level, we understand that transparent 1.8m high fencing (with motorized gate) is proposed along the rear boundary to Grant Street. This type of fencing is appropriate for this space as it provides a visual connection between the public and private spaces associated with the site's car park and allows for passive surveillance between the spaces. We note that Council has recommended that *"timber paling fencing is provided along the rear boundary, in conjunction with medium to tall growing trees"*. Solid fencing creates significant visual obstructions in car parks. From a criminal's perspective, obstructions reduce risk and provide opportunities for cover and entrapment. Once scaled, they also provide visual privacy to burglars. In fact, some criminals actively target homes and businesses that are hidden from view. As such, we would suggest that open palisade fencing (or similar) (with vertical elements, rather than any horizontal elements) be provided as transparent fencing to the rear south-eastern boundary to increase surveillance. We note opaque fencing is not necessary from a privacy point of view in this regard either. Timber paling fencing would be more suitable for the east and west side boundaries.

Landscaping

There is very limited landscaping proposed, being restricted to just along the western and southern boundary in the car parking area. We note Council has recommended "*medium to tall growing trees* ... *along the rear boundary*". We note that taller trees may obstruct valuable views out from the windows and decks of the residential dwellings on the first floor. We would suggest that species along the rear south-eastern boundary be limited to low growing ground covers or garden shrubs (<600mm high), to ensure views in and out of the car park are maintained. Taller, 1.8m maximum planting is more suitable to be used along the western boundary and would match the height of fencing here.

Lighting

Lighting in the form of solar sensor lighting will be provided within the car park area. This lighting will help maintain sightlines and illuminate potential concealment areas after dark when motion is detected. Sensor lighting is effective when clear sightlines are available from within and outside the site, and make it clearer to observe suspicious activity. Given the lower expected use of the car park at night (limited to residents more generally), the motion sensor lighting is appropriate.

We note that there is public street lighting along Grant and Melbourne Streets, ensuring that sightlines to and from the site are also available after dark. Under awning lighting (or similar) should be provided on the Melbourne Street frontage so that the residential access is illuminated at night.

CCTV and Technical Surveillance

Overt CCTV is likely to deter some crimes. In many instances however, they passively record events rather than prevent them. As such, natural and passive surveillance through the effective design of buildings is taken to be more effective to deter crime and when crime is actually occurring. This is particularly important as the capability of guardians to respond to incidents as they happen is more likely, especially if CCTV is not monitored. As the proposed development proposes both residential and commercial aspects, and has good natural and passive surveillance, CCTV is not required in this instance.



We understand that CCTV is not proposed, however, if future residents / lessees wish to install CCTV, the following locations would be optimal:

- At building entrances (facing out).
- Toward mail collection areas.
- At the waste storage and services area at the rear of the property.
- Pointed toward external car parking areas and exit.

Where CCTV cameras are used, they should be located up high and people should not be able to reach them (vandal resistant).

<u>Mailboxes</u>

Mailboxes for the two commercial offices and residences 1 and 2 are located in front of the residential entry way off Melbourne Street. It is recommended that if a group letter box is provided, a more suitable location would be the west side wall, adjacent the ramp. This location has a higher level of natural surveillance afforded by the commercial tenancies.

Assessment

The proposed development generally provides very good opportunity for natural surveillance. Limited additional measures are recommended to enhance this, considering the complementary nature of the residential and commercial elements in activating the site. Technical measures such as CCTV are unnecessary for a development of this type, nature and scale.

3.4.2. Access control

Access control reduces crime risk by attracting, channelling or restricting movement. By making it clear where people are permitted or not permitted to go, it limits the ability for potential offenders to reach and victimise people or the property. Illegible boundary markers and confusing spatial definition make it easy for criminals to make excuses for being in restricted areas. Access control can be established through natural, technical or organised controls such as landscaping, physical barriers, signage, security control etc.

Access control objectives and strategies include:

- Ensure that access to the development is controlled to reduce opportunities for crime.
- Restricted access to internal areas or high-risk areas (like car parks or other rarely visited areas). This is often achieved through the use of physical barriers.
- Establish landscapes and physical locations that channel and group pedestrians into target areas.
- Encourage public spaces which attract, rather than discourage people from gathering.

Assessment of proposal and recommendations – Access control

Physical Barriers

Confusion resulting from ambiguous entry design can legitimise exploration, trespassing and excuse making by opportunistic criminals.

We note that Council identified the zero lot boundary setback to the west to be problematic from a heritage and maintenance perspective. They also noted a setback was "also required to provide circulation space between the front elevation and the rear car park i.e. garbage bin storage/placement for kerb-side collection." Entry points for burglary are most often located at the side and rear of buildings. Studies among active burglars also show that access to the side or rear of buildings is an important consideration in target choice. As such, whilst we acknowledge that a setback is required from the adjoining western building, we recommend that this is secured and signposted for maintenance access only and not for general use. Further, we note that bin collection is from Grant Street (and not Melbourne Street as Council indicated), meaning that general access through this area is not necessary.

Access is controlled to the rear of the site with 1.8m high fencing and a motorized security gate, which is an effective means of regulating vehicle movement. We understand that access to the car park is only for



residents and commercial tenants of the site. No entrance or use of the carpark is proposed for any visitors (residential or commercial), ensuring that access to this area is controlled. This further ensures that no uncontrolled access is available to the office spaces on the ground floor or the residences above. Full details of rear 1.8m boundary fencing and gate have not been provided, but it is recommended that they are transparent and non-scalable (i.e., include vertical elements which do not provide natural ladders) – options can include palisade type fencing.

Importantly, the proposed buildings include access control in the form of locked doors and windows. Target hardening is a proven way of reducing illegal entry into property, and the use of basic locks to windows and doors is sufficient to increase crime effort in low to moderate risk situations such as this site.

The proposed landscaping is of an appropriate scale and location to avoid any opportunities for climbing and gaining unauthorised access to the buildings (i.e., via natural ladders). Similarly, the building does not provide accessible horizontal elements that could be used as ladders for entry into levels above, with levels above all elevated by non-scalable posts. The rear slimline water tanks are inset below and are of a width (compared to the above decks) that wouldn't allow someone to use them to climb up onto the above residential decks.

Bins, whilst not secured or screened, are located within the secured car park. We note that there is a single bin located on the east side below the stairs (presumably for the east side commercial tenacity). This bin is poorly located, concealed from view and provides a location for entrapment. We would suggest it is moved to the west side with the other commercial bin where there is greater surveillance.

It has as such been deemed that further physical barriers or similar is not necessary as the only anticipated access to the site will be by residents and legitimate users.

Symbolic barriers

The nature of the development and positioning of the building and symbolic barriers is such that the intended use of the site is clear and that individuals can make a clear deduction of where private and public space starts and ends. Again, signposting will enhance way finding and prevent unauthorised access to any restricted area of the site including the maintenance setback on the west side. Signage should also be provided to the rear car park to designate the area as a private space.

Assessment

Physical access to the site and buildings are restricted through the use of locked windows and doors and locked security gates (maintenance setback and rear car park). Signage will also assist in restricting peoples movements and designating appropriate spaces. Access control is not considered to be an issue and the surveillance opportunities discussed above will add to the prevention of crime and reduction of opportunity.

3.4.3. Territorial Reinforcement

Territorial reinforcement is linked to the principle of access control. Territorial reinforcement establishes a hierarchy of spaces that clearly identifies and aligns the design, definition and designation of areas. This can be achieved by a range of measures including appropriate design for use; territorial markers to reinforce the designation of areas; and appropriate environmental maintenance to promote ownership and use of spaces.

Territorial reinforcement objectives and strategies include:

- Ensure that the boundaries of the development are clearly defined to reduce excuse making and crime opportunities.
- Ensure that signage is displayed to provide guidance to users of the development and reduce excuse making opportunities.
- Promote design that encourages people to gather in public space and to feel some responsibility for its use and condition.
- Promote design with clear transitions and boundaries between public and private space.



Assessment of proposal and recommendations - Territorial reinforcement

The proposed front porches, rear fence and gate and clearly delineated private car parking area will ensures a clear transition between public and private space. As stated, there are existing physical barriers but there are also symbolic space transition ques which provide discernible property boundaries. For example, the rear car parking area off Grant Street provides for a clear transition between public and private space, with the internal car park being constructed of different pavement to the public road reserve and including landscaping provisions. Similarly, the front porches are slightly raised from the general pedestrian walkway and are constructed of differing material, distinguishing from the public thoroughfare.

The commercial spaces have clearly identifiable and accessible public entrances which will encourage legitimate users to enter the premises rather than linger in public spaces. Further, appropriate signage should be used. Business signage opposite Melbourne Street for the commercial spaces with hours of operation will discourage opportunities for crime and excuse making behaviour as users won't have a reasonable excuse to be in those areas of the site at times outside of standard hours.

Furthermore, whilst only standard business operating hours are proposed for the commercial spaces, the above residential tenancies will be occupied and activated during evenings and weekends, and a number of other businesses operate outside of standard hours. These on-site residences and surrounding uses, which as identified have good surveillance over the site, will ensure the space feels owned and cared for even during these out of hours times. The shared use of the land will enhance the use of this space, providing a welcoming setting for people.

Given the shared nature of the car park area and service areas between lessees, a sense of communal responsibility for maintaining this space will already be present, which will ensure the spaces appear well used and cared for. Strong ownership (territorial) cues ensure that the spaces will be properly used and not likely to be subject of damage or misuse.

Assessment

Territorial reinforcement is also used within the buildings as a supplement to symbolic barries / transitional ques and well cared for spaces. Access points appear as legible and inviting and signage should be provided to tenancies to assist with directing users of the site. Signage will further ensure personalisation of tenancies, which will heighten ownership cues on site. Signage should also be used to keep people out of areas such as the rear car park and maintenance area on the west side.

3.4.4. Environmental (space and activity) management

Activity and space management involves the supervision, control and care of space. A good space is often attractive, well maintained and therefore a well-used space. Linked to the principle of territorial reinforcement, environmental management ensures that space is appropriately utilised and well cared for. Activity and space management, while identified at the design stage through allocation of uses, are heavily dependent on management and enforcement. Space and activity management strategies are an important means of developing and maintaining *natural* community control.

Environmental management strategies include activity coordination, site cleanliness, rapid repair of vandalism and graffiti, the replacement of damaged/inoperative lighting and the removal or refurbishment of deteriorated physical elements. Other space management objectives and strategies include that residents are aware of their obligations in relation to any strata corporation. No details on potential strata subdivision have been provided at this time, however, the appropriate by-laws would be drafted (separate to the DA in which this report accompanies) and all residents within the scheme will need to follow them.

Assessment of proposal and recommendations – Environmental management

Good consistent management of the premises will contribute to natural surveillance and guardianship to reduce the overall risk of crime. We also note that the mixed-use area (i.e. commercial premises, licensed venues, service stations, recreational uses and residential neighbourhoods) offer more activity and add to a sense of 'around the clock usage'. This in turn increase risk to offenders and the effort required to commit crime as the spaces are so active and passive / natural surveillance is generally much higher.

The presence of rubbish signals a lack of care and guardianship. This may stimulate interest in potential offenders and avoidance behaviour in others. In this regard, the DA should include appropriate measures



for waste management and minimisation. Waste storage areas should also be kept clean and well managed.

Space management includes recommendations generally and good practices, which should be adopted as part of an overall site management plan (or similar):

- Provisions for staff and residents to promptly replace any vandalised, damaged, or defective
 equipment / property to avoid what is known as the "broken windows theory". This theory is a
 principle adopted by crime prevention specialists worldwide. The theory is that the presence of
 a broken window will entice vandals to break more windows in the affected building and even in
 neighbouring buildings. The sooner broken windows are repaired, the less likely it is that such
 vandalism will occur in the future. Graffiti and other forms of vandalism fall into this same
 category and should be managed effectively and quickly.
- Landscaped areas should be well maintained to help communicate care and guardianship. Generally, landscaping is maintained to an appropriate height (with tree foliage pruned up to 2m and tall vegetation thinned out regularly) to limit concealment and promote a well-maintained space to further increase natural community control and guardianship. Ground covers should be maintained to a height of <600mm.
- Buildings and public entrances, such as the front porches off Melbourne Street, should be clean and well-maintained to encourage regular use and reinforce strong territorial cues.



4. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

As stated, the assessment and recommendations in this report do not factor matters such as broader social, environmental or economic impacts. The assessment and recommendations are made only in relation to mitigating the risk of crime, antisocial behaviour and fear of crime for the proposed development. Should the proposal be altered significantly, these recommendations may require amendment under a revised CPTED assessment.

Following a review of the site context, the proposed development is deemed to have an overall lowmoderate risk of crime, subject to adopting the recommendations outlined in this report. The proposal integrates measures to mitigate the risk of crime including:

- Surveillance through appropriate sightlines, passive surveillance, building orientation, lighting and landscaping;
- Access control through appropriate physical and symbolic barriers;
- Territorial reinforcement through the appropriate delineation of spaces both internal and external;
- Activity and space management through designation of space and good provision of opportunities to enhance and maintain spaces.

A summary of the recommendations to reduce the risk of crime is as follows:

- Signposting is required to enhance wayfinding and prevent unauthorised access to any restricted area of the site whether internal or external. All internal and external signage and directions should be built / installed in accordance with the Australian standards
 - The 500mm setback to the adjoining building on the west side of the building is to be secured and signposted for maintenance access only, with no general use authorised.
 - The rear car park is to be appropriately signposted to distinguish the transition between public and private space and restrict unauthorised access. Access to the rear car park should be restricted to residential tenants and commercial tenants. No visitor parking or public access is permitted.
- Appropriate lighting should be provided in accordance with relevant Australian Standards (to be detailed at the construction certificate stage). All lighting should be installed high to avoid vandalism.
 - Solar sensor lighting is required within the car parking area as identified on the plans.
 - Under awning lighting (or similar) should be provided on the Melbourne Street frontage so that the residential access is illuminated at night.
- The group mailboxes opposite Melbourne Street are to be relocated to the west side building wall, adjacent the ramp so they are better surveyed.
- The single bin located on the east side of the building beneath the rear staircase is to be relocated to the west side of the car park where the other commercial bin is located.
- Site fencing should be 1.8m and non-scalable.
 - Transparent fencing and gate with non-horizontal elements should be provided along the south-eastern rear boundary to ensure appropriate surveillance in and out of the car park. Palisade type fencing or similar would be suitable.
 - Solid fencing is suitable for the east and west side boundaries. Timber paling or Colourbond is suitable.
- Site landscaping will need to be regularly maintained so that it does not become overgrown or unmanaged.
 - Low level ground covers (<600mm) are recommended along the rear south-eastern boundary along the security gate and thinned as required.



- o Taller hedges are suitable for the garden along the west side boundary.
- All entries and windows should be lockable.
- Ensure timely repair of damaged property and lighting, and 'rapid removal' approach to unauthorised graffiti. Consideration should be given to the use of graffiti resistant materials and surface treatments which are easy to clean / remove graffiti.

Where necessary the consent authority (Council) may provide conditions of consent to ensure the provision of crime reduction and safety measures identified in this report or elsewhere through the assessment.

A note about proximity to licensed venues

The literature advises us that street offences, public violence and vandalism often occur within eyesight of pubs and licensed premises. Shops and houses near licensed premises are at greater risk of crime than many other areas. In this respect, we would revisit relevant crime statistics. Specifically, the crime of "assault" is one in which a filter can be applied to differentiate between alcohol or non-alcohol related incidents.

The statistics presented in Section 3.3.2 for "assault" suggested the effectiveness of existing practices at licenced premises in East Maitland with respect to the responsible service of alcohol. This suggested that the proposed development's proximity to licensed premises will not subject visitors / residents to higher rates of assault. Logically, this trend could be extended to the other prevalent crime types in the locality too.

As such, and given the locations high level of access control and surveillance, the development's proximity to licensed venues does not require any specific mitigation measures or adversely enhance the development's risk of crime.



5. CONCLUSION

This Crime Risk Assessment has been prepared to assess the crime risk relating to the proposed shop top housing development at 34 Melbourne Street, East Maitland NSW 2323 (Lot 1 Sec 15A DP15148).

This report identifies that there is a **low to moderate** risk of crime occurring within and around the proposed development, based upon a review of crime statistics, trends and observations made at the time this assessment was conducted. Recommendations are made throughout the report to mitigate the risk of crime, antisocial behaviour and fear of crime for the proposed development.

Following implementation of recommendations, an overall crime risk category of **low** has been given to the development considering the following:

- While the rates and risk of crime is relatively high in East Maitland when compared to the greater Maitland LGA, this particular development in its context and setting is not anticipated to reflect this broader statistic in reality. The proposed activity is entirely appropriate for this area (mixed use), being non-conflicting with surrounding development, and is not a land use (or at a scale) that will alter the current demographics of the area to a degree that could result in increased or altered crime trends.
- Table 3-3 suggests that rates of retail theft are higher compared with other forms of theft in East Maitland. Notably the expected commercial spaces won't be "retail" as such, where higher volumes of visitors are expected and greater opportunities for theft are possible, instead being office space or the like. Further, "break and enter – dwelling and non-dwelling" were lower than retail theft and as such, we would expect that lower rates of theft to occur for a development which includes shop top housing. Further, the provision of the residential component of this development will help monitor and provide surveillance for the tenancies below, particularly at night, and vice versa when people are less likely to be home during the day when the offices will be open and the commercial spaces activated. Therefore, a lower risk rating can be given to theft in this regard.
- Table 3-4 suggests that East Maitland recorded higher incident rates of malicious damage to
 property than Maitland LGA, with the highest incidents occurring on residential premises,
 carparks and retail/wholesale premises. The statistics do not distinguish between specific types
 of residential development, be that a single dwelling or a medium density development, and
 office spaces are not distinguished either. Regardless, it was recommended that the proposed
 development focus on CPTED principles of access control and surveillance for the residences,
 car parks and the office spaces to prevent malicious damage. The assessment above concludes
 that there is a high level of appropriate access control and good natural and passive surveillance
 is available. Therefore, a lower risk rating can be given to malicious damage in this regard.
- Table 3-5 suggests the highest recorded incidents of assault in East Maitland were nondomestic related. The proposal does include non-domestic elements such as the office / commercial space. However, it is relevant to note that the proposed office uses are not ones in which there are inherently higher rates of crime, and there are no "office" subsets for the category of assault to investigate either. So, when considering that the proposal includes residential elements with low impact office type uses (which have a lower rate of assault occurring), a lower risk rating should be applied.
- Table 3-5 highlights that rates of alcohol related domestic and non-domestic assaults are lower than non-alcohol related assaults. These statistics can suggest the effectiveness of existing practices at licenced premises in East Maitland with respect to the responsible service of alcohol. This suggests that the proposed development's proximity to licensed premises will not subject visitors / residents to higher rates of assault.
- The building and spaces on site have been designed well to ensure that there is a good level of
 passive surveillance orientated toward the street and parking area, and the transition between
 public and private space has been well delineated on this site through the use of physical and
 symbolic barriers. Space management should be kept up through the operational phase of this
 development.



• The low rating overall is achieved by the developments ability to comply with and show good consideration for the CPTED principles, which is also reflected in the small number of mitigation measures and recommendations made by this report, with many of them being general and standard recommendations.

The community value an urban lifestyle when it is safe, appropriate and well-managed. This report demonstrates that the proposal can achieve the aims and objectives of the strategic and policy context where social and crime risk is concerned, in as far as it recommends consideration of the CPTED principles and promotes safe and vibrant communities.

It is considered that by implementing the recommendations contained in this assessment, criminal activity will be reduced and the safety of visitors and the security of the subject site will be increased. However, it does not guarantee that all risks have been identified or that the area assessed will be free from criminal activity, even if the recommendations are implemented.



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